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ABSTRACT
Abstract. Information centric networking (ICN) using architectures such as Publish-Subscribe Internet
Routing  Paradigm  (PSIRP)  or  Publish-Subscribe  Internet  Technology  (PURSUIT)  has  been
proposed as an important candidate for the Internet of the future. ICN is an emerging research area
that proposes a transformation of the current host centric Internet architecture into an architecture
where information items are of primary importance. This change allows network functions such as
routing and locating to be optimized based on the information items themselves. The Bloom filter
based  content  delivery  is  a  source-routing  scheme  that  is  used  in  the  PSIRP/PURSUIT
architectures. Although this mechanism solves many issues of today’s Internet such as the growth of
the  routing  table  and the  scalability  problems,  it  is  vulnerable  to  distributed  denial-of-service
(DDoS) attacks. In this paper, we present a new content delivery scheme that has the advantages of
Bloom filter based approach while at the same time being able to prevent DDoS attacks on the
forwarding  mechanism.  Our  security  analysis  suggests  that  with  the  proposed  approach,  the
forwarding plane is able to resist attacks such as DDoS with very high probability.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Today’s Internet architecture was deployed in the 1960/70’s to address the basic communication
needs that were necessary at that period. And indeed, it has successfully and efficiently solved
the  technical  problems  that  arose  in  the  past  decades.  In  fact,  a  key  aim  of  the  original
architecture was to interconnect end-to-end limited machines that were used by a small number
of trusted users to allow remote access and share a small amount of data, at a time when the
network speed was just a few Kbps. Therefore, early usage was mainly around host-to-host
services such as remote access and file transfer. However, this is radically different from the
situation today where security threats such as viruses, phishing and distributed denial-of-service
(DDoS) attacks are widespread, the number of Internet users is in rapid increase (≈ 3 billions
[24]) and there is an increasing need to support emerging mobile applications at large scale. The
Internet cannot efficiently handle these emerging issues and it has been difficult to apply major
architectural  changes  to  the  Internet  to  cope  effectively  with  these  requirements  [25].
Subsequently,  a  number  of  important  shortcomings  of  this  architecture  have  been  reported
[23,16].  In  fact,  the  Internet  is  not  working  efficiently  when  it  comes  to  security,  routing
scalability, QoS, and content delivery.
From a security perspective, the current Internet architecture was built with the principle that it
would be used by trustworthy users in a cooperative and open environment. Therefore, user
privacy, information integrity, and user authentication mechanisms were not requirements and
consequently have not  been considered in  the  original  design.  Moreover,  since the original
design  is  based  on  named  hosts;  it  provides  the  sender  with  a  complete  control  over  the
communication to send almost any arbitrary traffic at any time to anyone and without any pre-
authorisation, and the Internet is highly suitable to deliver this traffic to the intended destination.
Unfortunately, the openness of the Internet, which was a critical success factor, now offers no
protection for network nodes. Therefore, it is relatively easy to launch DDoS attacks which may
cause severe and serious issues, e.g. by flooding some limited resources on the Internet, thus
preventing legitimate network traffic. It is also relatively easy for malicious users to hide their
identity by using a fake source address.
To mitigate DDoS attacks, a number of network capability proposals have been deployed with
various  success  [32].  Network  capability  refers  to  any  mechanism  that  allows  routers  to
statelessly verify if  the packet has been previously authorized [8].  In such a proposal,  each
packet carries information so that routers can identify if the packet is requested by the receiver.
Therefore, any sender must first get an authorization-to-send capability from the receiver before
being able to send data.  The receiver permits  the communication either directly [46,45],  or
indirectly using a third party system [44,35]. Source address filtering [17] is an example of
network capabilities that enables routers to filter traffic at the network ingress and egress by
identifying spoofed IP address. Although it prevents attackers from replacing their IP address
with a random fake one, it is not effective in today’s network where attackers can use a large
number of compromised machines, i.e. zombies, with a real IP address.
As these issues are related to the core architecture of the Internet, most of the solutions are just
add-on  functionalities,  which  in  turn  have  increased  complexity.  A  number  of  research
discussions have investigated the current  challenges  to  identify the  main  requirements  of  a
future  Internet.  In  this  context,  a  new  networking  paradigm,  termed  information-centric
networking (ICN),  has recently been proposed,  aiming at  replacing the existing host-centric
networking paradigm to address the aforementioned issues [13, 3]. One of the basic features of
ICN is to name information items themselves, rather than naming and connecting hosts. This
fundamental shift has direct implications on network and systems security issues such as DDoS,
which is the focus of this work.
There are some research projects that have developed advanced ICN solutions, such as: Data
Oriented  Network  Architecture  (DONA)  [29];  Named  Data  Networking  (NDN)  [27,26];
Scalable  and Adaptive  Internet  Solutions  (SAIL)  [2,11];  Content  Mediator  Architecture  for
Content  Aware  Networks  (COMET)  [1];  and,  Publish-Subscribe  Internet  Technology
(PURSUIT) [18,31].
The  forwarding  mechanisms,  used  in  above  mentioned  ICN  architectures,  can  be  broadly
classified into two types: stateful (e.g. as in NDN) and stateless (e.g. as in PSIRP/PURSUIT).
The  problem of  DDoS  attacks  in  ICN  architectures  that  use  stateful  forwarding  has  been
extensively  studied  in  several  works  (e.g.,  [22,14]).  Therefore,  in  this  work  we  study  the
implications  of  DDoS  attacks  on  stateless  forwarding,  using  as  an  example  the
PSIRP/PURSUIT ICN architecture (in the following referred to as PURSUIT architecture). The
PURSUIT  architecture  defines  three  distinct  types  of  network  entities,  namely  publishers,
subscribers,  and  the  mediation  system [15].  Publishers  announce  and provide  the  available
information objects by sending in the network the publication messages. Subscribers send the
subscription messages whereby showing their interest in receiving certain information objects.
Contrary to the traditional host-centric paradigm, the subscriber does not need to be aware of
the publisher’s IP address. The mediation system consists of two logical entities: the rendezvous
function (RV) [34,43] and the topology management (TM) function [21,36]. These two entities
control  and manage another entity:  the forwarding (FW) function [28,37,39,47,40,38].  Each
information item in the network is uniquely identified by the pair rendezvous identifier (RId)
and the scope identifier  (SId).  SIds are used to organise the information items  into scopes,
whereas RIds identify items within scopes. The RV is responsible for receiving the publication
and subscription messages and determining the set of publishers and subscribers for a given RId
of the information item within a specified scope. When the RV detects a match, it contacts the
TM  who  is  responsible  for  maintaining  the  intra-domain  topological  knowledge  within  a
domain and for constructing the delivery path from the publisher to the subscriber. When the
path is ready, the content can be delivered via a chain of FW nodes from the publisher to the
subscriber by deciding where packets should be forwarded.
Although the communication paradigm of PURSUIT has tried to decouple the information from
its source location, so that a sender would not be able to send anything unless a subscription is
received, recent studies have shown that a DDoS attacks are still possible [9]. In [37], it has
been  shown  that  the  Line  Speed  Publish/Subscribe  Inter-networking  (LIPSIN)  forwarding
scheme used in PURSUIT is vulnerable to computational attacks and replay attacks which can
be used to launch DDoS attacks. In the same work, in order to offer DDoS resistant forwarding,
the  zFormation  technique  has  been  proposed.  This  technique  has  been  studied  from  the
viewpoint of TM scalability in [7]. The works of [37, 7] have been extended in [4] to mitigate
the brute-force attacks on the LIPSIN scheme and to reduce the DDoS attack probability.
Building upon the LIPSIN scheme and network capabilities work [8,17,37], this paper proposes
a content delivery approach that effectively prevents DDoS attacks using network capabilities.
The rest  of  the paper is  organised as follows.  In Section 2,  we present  an overview of the
PURSUIT  ICN  architecture,  the  scheme  used  for  packet  forwarding  and  its  security
vulnerabilities.  We also point  out  the  limitation of  the  existing solutions.  In  Section 3,  we
present our proposed secure forwarding mechanism. In Section 4, we analyse the resistance of
our solution to DDoS, and conclude the paper in Section 5.
2. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
2.1. The PURSUIT architecture
The PURSUIT project [19] brings two concepts to form an ICN solution: mediated assisted
forwarding and publish/subscribe communication. The basic PURSUIT architectural model is
given in Fig. 1. In order for a publisher to announce a publication, it must know the SId within
which the information object to be published, as well as to create an RId for the item. As we
observe in the figure, initially the publisher notifies the RV that it can provide an information
item, by sending the corresponding RId and SId. Next, the subscriber notifies RV that it wishes
to receive the item. The RV detects the matching and asks the topology manager to compute the
delivery path from the publisher to the subscriber. The TM, after having accomplished this task,
encodes the delivery path into a Bloom filter [10] and sends it to the publisher. Finally,  the
publisher and the on-path FW nodes will use this Bloom filter as the forwarding identifier (FId).
Below we will explain how the FId is created and used for packet forwarding decisions. LIPSIN
[28] is one of the developed forwarding techniques of the PURSUIT ICN and uses the Bloom
filter based content delivery.  Bloom filters are memory-efficient data structures that perform
fast  creation and membership tests.  In order to realise content  delivery using Blooms,  each
network link is identified with a unique link identifier (LId). Typically, an LId is an m-bit array 
Figure.1. A general view of the PURSUIT architecture.
and  k hash functions are used to set bits to 1, with  k <<  m. These two parameters value are
subject to some optimization criteria [12]. Some typical values are m = 256 and k = 5 [28,37].
An example of the Bloom-filter based approach is illustrated in Fig. 2. Consider a small network
consisting of 5 forwarding nodes,  one publisher  and 3 subscribers.  Each link is  assigned a
statistically unique LId with m = 8. Assume that Sub-B wishes to receive an information item
from Pub-A. For this to be achieved, as discussed above, the TM has to encode the LIds of the
delivery tree into an FId and send it to Pub-A. The encoding is done by performing the bitwise
OR operation. As shown in Fig. 2, Pub-A places the FId in the header and forward the packet to
its edge forwarding node (FW-1). Then, this node examines each of its outgoing interfaces (i.e.
LId-2 and LId-3), by performing the forwarding membership test. The forwarding test is done
by performing the logical AND operation on the FId and the outgoing LId. If the result of this
AND operation equals to the LId, then the packet will be sent via the corresponding link. As we
observe in Fig. 2, the packet will be sent to the FW-3. This FW node will also perform the same
forwarding test on all its outgoing links, and so on. Finally, the requested information item will
reach Sub-B, but not Sub-A and Sub-C, since the forwarding tests at FW-1 and FW-5 over LId-
2 and LId-8, respectively, will fail.
Figure.2. LIPSIN based forwarding using Bloom filters.
2.2 False positive issue and security chain reactions
One limitation of the LIPSIN forwarding is that some packets may be unnecessarily forwarded
to non-provisioned links. That is, the forwarding test, described above, may give false positives.
For instance, suppose that LId-8 is equal to 00101000 in Fig. 2. Since this LId has not been
included in the path from Pub-A to Sub-B, the FId created by the TM is as shown in the figure.
Nevertheless, the forwarding test at the FW-5 will falsely produce a positive result for the LId-
8. This shortcoming may generate infinite loops which become a security issue if exploited by a
malicious node. It may lead to DDoS attacks against end-users or some parts in the network by
deliberately creating false positives in sensitive links. In practice, the attacker could perform
several  attacks  such  as  flow  duplication,  packet  aggregations,  and  forwarding  loops,
overwhelming the network resources [40].
2.3 Security vulnerabilities in the forwarding plane
In this section, we highlight the vulnerabilities of the LIPSIN mechanism. First of all, note that
when all bits are set to 1 in a FId, the packet will be delivered to every network node, because
the forwarding test will give a positive result at every FW node. To address this issue, LIPSIN
sets an upper limit on the number of bits set to 1 in a FId. The ratio of the bits set to 1 over the
total bits, m, is called fill factor and denoted by ρ. In the example of Fig. 2, the FId has ρ = 4/8 =
0.5. In the literature, a typical value of the fill factor upper limit is ρm = 0.5 [37,40]. Any FId
with ρ > ρm will be immediately rejected by FW nodes.
Another security threat  that  may arise is when the attacker is exploiting false positives and
launching the brute-force attack to reach a targeted end-node. To achieve that, the attacker tires
all possible FIds with the aim to obtain a valid FId that reaches a target node. The number of
possible FIds depends on the FId length, m, and the maximum fill factor,  ρm. The probability,
pfw, to guess a working FId created with a maximum fill factor of ρm, k hash functions and goes
to a target l hops away can be calculated as follows [37,4]:
                                                                                                                                   (1)
Other types of attacks, such as replay attacks and computational attacks, are also possible. In a
replay attack, some non-requested traffic with a previously created valid FId, is injected into the
network.  A computational  attack  is  started  by gathering  legitimate  FIds  and inspecting  the
correlation of their bit patterns.
2.4 Secure zFormation
One factor that strengthens the security threats is the use of time-invariant LIds. The zFormation
approach, proposed in [37], makes FIds expire after a certain time by periodically changing the
LIds every ∆t (duration of time that a LId is valid). A cryptographically secure hash function,
called zFormation, computes the LIds based on the following parameters:
– Some content-based information, T, such as the flow Id or the RId.
– Periodically changing time-based secret key shared with FW nodes, K(t).
– The port number of an incoming or outgoing link, I and O, respectively.
– The optimization index, d, to mitigate the false positives proposed in [28].
As a result, the LIds become dynamic and bound to a specific content-related information and
have limited time duration. This approach provides sufficient protection against replay attacks
and computational attacks. However, in [4], we have demonstrated that the zFormation solution
is still vulnerable to successful DDoS attacks if either the fill factor of the FId is too large or ∆t
is too long. In practice, we found that an attacker can inject unwanted traffic, using a fake FId,
in a path up to 5 hops within only 23s, using a reasonable attacking rate of 106 packet/s, i.e. by
having a packet size of 103 bits and 109 bit/s capacity on each edge link. The issue of brute-force
attacks has been addressed in [4,5], where the impact of  ρm and m, respectively, on the attack
capability has been studied.
Moreover,  although  the  zFormation  mechanism  has  effectively  made  DDoS  attack  more
expensive to be successfully launched, in [9] it has been shown that attacker can penetrate the
secrecy of  LIds.  Consequently,  they could  launch DDoS to a  specific  target  if  a  sufficient
number  of  LIds  are  identified.  In  this  case,  the  attacker  launches what  is  called a reverse-
engineering attack over the secret LIds and by using a botnet that is randomly distributed around
the network. In particular, all compromised nodes in the botnet subscribe to information items
from each other. Assuming that the attacker has knowledge of the network topology,  it first
collects all  legitimate FIds created by the TM for all  pairs of bot nodes. Since the network
topology is known, the attacker is able to know the connectivity graph and the FW nodes of
which each FId passes  through.  Therefore,  for  each FW node it  can figure  out  the  LId by
computing the intersection of the FIds that passes through the FW node by taking a bitwise
AND operation over the FIds. The accuracy of the computed LIds may just be approximation to
the real  ones with some extra bit  set  to one,  but  this  does not  affect  the attack,  unless the
maximum fill factor is exceeded. The attacker then can build FIds to attack a victim without
receiving any help from the TM.
However, it is obvious that after obtaining the LIds and building a valid FId, the attack is only
limited to a short time duration due to the periodic LIds/FIds updates. Therefore, a frequent
update of the LIds can minimise the effect of the attack, since the old FIds are expired after the
update.
3. THE PROPOSED SECURE FORWARDING MECHANISM
3.1 Overview
To mitigate brute-force attacks and subsequently prevent DDoS attacks, a validation mechanism
is required to check the legitimacy of FIds that are sent by publishers to the network. This
mechanism should not add any additional overhead on the TM, such as maintaining a large
number of shared keys with each FW node in the network. In practice, we seek a mechanism
that  prevents  the  attack locally  on  the  forwarding  plane in  a  stateless  manner  and without
involving any other entity rather than the corresponding FW node. We consider these issues in
the  proposed  secure  forwarding  mechanism.  In  this  scheme,  in  addition  to  performing  the
forwarding test at each FW node, as proposed in the zFormation technique, we also introduce a
security test at the ingress node, so that any attack is prevented at early stage. In the following,
the FW node that is directly attached to a user node (publisher/subscriber) is called Edge-FW.
For instance, in Fig. 2, the Edge-FW nodes are FW-1, FW-4 and FW-5. The approach proposed
in this paper uses pre-defined and fixed LIds, as in the traditional LIPSIN mechanism. This is
different  from is  the  zFormation  technique,  discussed  in  Section  2.4,  which  uses  dynamic
changeable LIds.
Our solution is based on the following assumptions: (1) links from users to Edge-FW nodes are
assumed to be local, i.e. not used by the TM in the FId generation. On the other hand, links from
Edge-FW node to users are global and are included in FId generation. (2) Each Edge-FW node
maintains two 128-bit long master keys, k1 and k2. (3) As in current access network scenarios,
the attacker has no special privileges in the network but can send arbitrary packets up to the
capacity of the access link.
3.2. Secure FId generation
We should recall that the TM knows the network topology. Also, it is mainly responsible for
finding the best path between publishers and subscribers. Our proposed forwarding scheme is
illustrated by a simple  example of Fig.  3 (a).  In this example,  FW-1 is  the Edge-FW node
responsible for performing the security check. We refer to the legitimate forwarding identifier
contracted by topology manager as FId and to its encrypted version as eFId; whereas the one
utilised by the publisher is denoted as eFIdp and its decrypted version is FIdp. The hash that is
performed over  eFId is  called  h,  and the hash used by the publisher  is  called hp.  When a
legitimate,  non-hostile publisher is  using the network,  each pair  of  each pair  of  {FId,FIdp},
{eFId,eFIdp}, and {h,hp} will be identical. This is because a legitimate publisher will be using
eFId that is generated by the Edge-FW, without any form of malicious manipulation.
In our proposed scheme, when generating FId, link from publisher to Edge-FW node is not
included in the delivery tree. Also,  TM provides Edge-FW node with an outgoing interface
number or an access media address to the publisher where FId should be forwarded. Therefore,
in Fig. 3, to create FId that connects the publisher Pub with the subscriber Sub, TM encodes the
Figure.3. Edge-FW approach: (a) An example of the FId creation and packet forwarding. (b)
Encrypting the FId at the Edge-FW node. (c) Generating the hash h at the Edge-FW node.
links LId-1, LId-2, and LId-3 into the Bloom filter and then performs a bitwise-OR operation
over them. FId generated in this way is then sent to FW-1 node which is the publisher’s Edge-
FW node.
Upon receiving the FId by the FW-1, the AES algorithm is applied to encrypt it. The encrypted
version is denoted as eFId. This is done in order to preserve the confidentiality of the FId. This
way, computational attack by a potentially malicious publisher can be prevented. It should be
noted that in this scheme, all encryption and decryption processes are performed using AES.
This  encryption  algorithm can  be  implemented  in  a  number  of  efficient  ways,  and  it  was
designed from the very beginning as a cipher which can be implemented efficiently, both in
software or hardware. It is considered scalable and performs well when used in IPsec/IPv6 [20].
Recently,  it  has been shown that AES can be accelerated to work at line-speed of 10 Gbps
requiring only 8 processor cores running at 3 GHz [30]. This feature makes AES particularly
suitable for PURSUIT ICN.
To prevent DDoS attacks, the FW-1 generates a 64-bit  hash h over the eFId. This way,  the
resultant hash becomes bound to a certain identifier. Afterwards, the pair {eFId,h} is sent to the
Pub and will be used to send traffic to the Sub. The procedure of encrypting the FId is shown in
Fig. 3(b). To encrypt the received FId, FW-1 copies FId into fast memory and then splits it into
two parts: FId1, FId2, each of which is 128-bit long (for compatibility with the keys length.
Next, each part is encrypted separately with the master key k1 and results in eFId1, eFId2. The
last step is performed by concatenating eFId1 and eFId2 to form a 256-bit encrypted eFId. The
hash creation procedure is shown in Fig. 3(c), where the process starts by repeating Steps 1 and
2 of  the  FId  encryption  procedure.  In  Step  3,  FW-1 encrypts  FId1  and FId2 with  k2 which
protects the hash.
Next, in Step 4, these sub eFIds are further split into four parts, each of which is 64bits long.
Then, a bitwise-XOR operation is taken over them to form a 64-bit hash h. The purpose of this
process is to preserve the integrity of the original eFId so that any forged eFIdp, used by the
publisher, is identified.
3.3 Secure FId forwarding
When the pair {eFId,h} is created, it is then forwarded by FW-1, as shown in Fig. 3, through the
outgoing interface given by TM to the relevant  directly connected publisher.  The publisher
places  this  pair  on each  transmitted  packet.  Next,  when the FW-1 node  receives  a  packet,
initially it will perform two tests: the security test and the forwarding test. The security test will
validate the received eFIdp (i.e., whether this eFIdp is legitimate). This test is done at the Edge-
FW node and only for  packets  received from the  publisher’s  side.  The forwarding test,  as
described previously, is the basic LIPSIN membership check and will decide the next hops of
the received packets. A packet is sent to next hop only if it can pass both tests. In the security
test, the Edge-FW node also verifies the integrity of the received eFIdp. This verification is
performed as shown in Algorithm 1.
If the packet will pass the security test, the eFIdp is considered legitimate. Then, the Edge-FW
node drops the hash h and replaces the eFIdp with the FIdp, which should be identical to the
original FId in a non-malicious communication. Afterwards, the forwarding test is done for each
outgoing interface using FIdp. If the test is positive, the packet will be sent to the next FW node
in the path. The forwarding test is done at each FW node until the packet reaches the Edge-FW
node of the subscriber. At this stage, the FIdp is discarded before forwarding the packet to the
subscriber. This prevents the reverse-engineering attack mentioned in Section 2.4, where the
attacker tries to obtain simultaneous valid plaintext forwarding identifiers from compromised
subscribers to obtain useful information about the network topology by analysing the correlation
between a large number of forwarding identifiers.
According to our proposed approach,  the master  key  k2,  is  periodically changed to mitigate
replay attacks. Therefore, an attacker who possesses a valid encrypted pair {eFId,h} cannot use
it maliciously to send unwanted traffic forever, as the hash is expires once the key is changed.
The attacker is limited within the time window of k2 update. For long-lived flows, FIds that are
about  to  expire can be updated when TM send new  k2 keys  to Edge-FW nodes.  Also,  this
approach requires that RV checks periodically its event table periodically within the specified
time window looking for events that need to be updated. Hence, the relevant Edge-FW node is
informed by TM about these events in order for the FId to be updated with a new hash. If an
information  item is  not  wanted any longer,  the  subscriber  will  send a  remove  subscription
request. Otherwise, RV will assume that the subscriber is still interested in the item and the
Edge-FW node will be informed about extending the communication by generating a new hash.
The problem of selecting a suitable time window for the aforementioned FId update operation
has been studied in [6]. 
Algorithm 1. The security test procedure at the Edge-FW mode
4. ATTACK ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION
Although most of the proposed false positive reduction techniques [28,12,42] have effectively
added a control over the false positive rate and kept it at a minimum, they are unfortunately not
useful when brute-force attacks are considered. These proposals aim at optimizing FIds in terms
of the false positive rate, at their formation stage and then placing some relevant optimization
parameters in the packet to be used by the forwarding plane. However, these techniques do not
consider  anomalous  behavior  where  publishers  maliciously  ignore  or  alter  the  in-packet
parameters; consequently,  an attacker subverts the forwarding process such that the minimal
false positive rate no longer applies. For example, the LId-Tag (LIT)-based solution proposed in
[28] aims at  reducing the false positives.  According to this approach,  a subset  of  LIds that
results in lowest false positive rate is chosen from the set of all available d LIds. Then, the  d
value corresponding to the selected subset is inserted in the packet header. This strategy is not
suitable for mitigating brute-force DDoS attacks, since the attacker is able to use an arbitrary
value of d to achieve a successful attack with high probability. Also, taking into account that 
Figure.4. The sequential checks to be achieved by the attacker to reach a victim 4-hop away
from an attacking node.
this strategy does not perform a verification mechanism at the FW node to force the attacker to
use the original selected value of d. Indeed, it would not be possible for the FW node to know
which value of d is actually the correct one.
On the contrary,  our proposed secure forwarding mechanism can effectively stop the attacks
described in Section 2.3. For example, if an attacker wants to inject unwanted traffic to a victim
who is four hops away, then he first must pass both the security test and the forwarding test at
his Edge-FW node, and also pass three forwarding tests in the subsequent in-path FW nodes, as
shown in Fig. 4. Below, we perform an analysis of the probability of injecting unwanted traffic
using the brute-force method.
The probability  of  passing the forwarding test  pfw:  This  is  the  probability of  having false
positives in the delivery path. This is calculated as in (1).
The probability of passing the security test psc: Introducing the security test at the Edge-FW
node makes DDoS attack using brute force much expensive. This is because for this type of
attack, the attacker has to guess the hash correctly. Therefore, for example, if the hash is 64-bit
long, the attacker has to send 264 packets to the Edge-FW node, and the probability of being
successful is approximately 5.4 × 10−20. This is a very low probability which makes this attack
scenario unrealistic in practice.
However, a better strategy the attacker could adopt is to launch the attack taking into account
that fact that all hash functions suffer from the birthday paradox attack [41]. It is a generic
collision-finding attack performed by using a probabilistic model to reduce the complexity of
cracking a hash function. Let us demonstrate how a collision can be found in the context of our
approach, let us assume  H is a hash function such that  H : D → R, where  D is the set of all
possible combinations of FIds, R is the range of H, and |R| = r. A hash collision occurs when
having distinct eFId1, eFId2 ∈ D where H(FId1) = H(FId2). By exploiting the birthday paradox,
the attacker creates a packet with an independently and uniformly random selected  FId1, ...,
FIdq, along with a random hash h1,..., hq, where q is the number of the attempts, to be sent to the
Edge-FW node. The aim is to cause a hash collision at the Edge-FW node where two distinct
FIds give the same hash; so, the packet is treated as legitimate and, hence, successfully passes
the security test. This strategy significantly reduces the number of attempts q, as it is expected
that the attacker finds a collision within r1/2 attempts with a probability of psc ≈ 0.5 [41].
                                                                                                      (2)
where r is the number of all possible hash outputs.
The number of required attempts increases as the hash length increases, and generally, the hash
function  length  is  chosen  to  be  large  enough  to  make  the  number  of  attempts  infeasible.
However, since the Edge-FW approach utilizes a hash size of only 64-bit  long,  to limit  the
security overhead, this means that within ≈ 42 × 108 attempts the attacker may pass the security
test  with  probability  psc  =  0.5.  Therefore,  we  introduce  a  blocking  mechanism  where  a
publisher who exceeds a certain amount of packet drops is assumed to be a malicious user and,
hence, is blocked. The packet drops at the Edge-FW node occur due to a failure in either the
security test or the forwarding test. The blocking mechanism is an effective countermeasure, as
it  prevents  the  attack  at  its  early  stage.  However,  an  attack  success  probability  of  0.5  is
considered high as the attacker might  be lucky and pass the security test  based on his first
attempt so the blocking mechanism is not effective in this case. Therefore, the network designer
may select a very low probability of success psc and then block any attack before reaching the
required number of attempts of achieving the selected probability. To determine the number of
required attack attempts x, that inject random pairs {FId,h}, to achieve a target probability psc
of finding a hash collision, we adopt the approximation of [33].
Figure.5. The expected number of attempts required to find a collision in 64-bit long hash for
different probability pr.
In Fig. 5 we show the number of required attempts, x, to find collision in a 64-bit long hash (that
is r =  1.8  ×  1019),  assuming  various  different  desired  collision  probabilities  psc =
{1×10−15,1×10−12,1×10−9,1×10−6,1×10−2,0.1,0.25,0.5}. We observe that the number of required
attempts, x, is decreased as the selected psc decreases. For example, the attacker would need to
generate and send approximately 6 × 108 packets to find a collision and pass the security test
with a probability of 1%. However, if we assume even a lower probability of  psc = 10−9, this
would  require  approximately  1.9  ×  105 attempts.  For  this  reason,  we  suggest  blocking  the
publisher after making ≈ 105 failed attempts, which is a large number and the probability that
the attacker could succeed is very small and approximately equal to 10−9. In fact, the probability
of passing the EdgeFW node is actually lower than that because the attacker also has to pass the
forwarding test.
Our  approach  also  introduces  an  additional  mitigation  layer  to  brute-force  attacks.  This  is
because in this approach, the attacker loses the ability to inject maximally filled eFIdp to the
network, which is considered a fundamental strategy to follow as it increases the probability of
passing the forwarding test. This strategy now becomes harder to be used because the bit pattern
of the injected eFIdp will be changed after the decryption process at the Edge-FW node, which
may result in an FId with two cases: an FId with ρ > ρm, so the packet is dropped or an FId with
the chance of success is low. Hence, to reach a victim, the attacker must be” incredibly lucky”
and pass both tests at the Edge-FW node and also the forwarding test at all in-path FW nodes.
The probability of a successful attack can be calculated by:
                                                                  pa = psc × pfw                                                           (3)
Figure.6. Comparison of the probability of successful attack for different path lengths between
LIPSIN and Edge-FW approaches. The number of hash function used is k = 5 with n = {23, 29}.
The Bloom filter size used in LIPSIN is m = 320 whereas in Edge-FW m = 256 plus 64-bit hash
h.
This probability of successful attack pa is actually an upper bound, since this equation assumes
that the decrypted forged FId is still maximally filled.
Figure 6 depicts the probability pa for varying attack path lengths l  for the current LIPSIN
scheme and our proposed Edge-FW scheme. We compare the probability pa in LIPSIN using a
Bloom filter size of m = 320-bit; whereas in our approach m = 256-bit is used. This is because
the Edge-FW approach introduces an extra size of 64-bit hash, so the overall introduced size in
the  Edge-FW approach is  320-bit.  In  both  approaches,  we  assume  a  network  that  supports
different sizes of a maximum delivery tree, n = {23,29} LIds, with k = 5. Subsequently, in the
case of having 23 LIds,  ρm would be 0.347 for the basic LIPSIN and 0.423 for the Edge-FW
mechanism; and when using 29 LIds ρm would be 0.48 and 0.42, for the basic LIPSIN and the
Edge-FW mechanisms, respectively.
The  figure  on  the  left  corresponds  to  the  scenario  where  n =  23.  We  observe  substantial
improvement of the probability pa for the Edge-FW approach. For instance, when  psc = 10−6,
then  pa ≈ 1.3 × 10−8.  This is much lower than  ≈ 0.0001 of the current LIPSIN scheme. The
forwarding plane becomes even more secure when psc is chosen to be 10−9 as the probability of
attack, pa, in this case sinks to ≈ 1.3 × 10−11. It can be noticed that when psc is selected to be 10−3,
the Edge-FW approach does not perform well compared to the LIPSIN, especially when the
path increases over 6 hops. This is true because the value of ρm used in the Edge-FW mechanism
is significantly small compared to that in the LIPSIN. It is possible to increase the size of the
maximum supported delivery tree as in the right figure where  n = 29 at the cost of having a
higher attack probability, pa.
The mechanism introduced in this paper is important as it stops an attacker sending malicious
packets using a random FId, which in the PURSUIT architecture could be a multicast tree and
potentially could reach a large number of end-users that have not requested the data. It is useful
to also compare this with contemporary IP networking where it is possible to send packets with
spoofed IP addresses or packets without a user requesting them. The mechanism presented here
stops this kind of malicious behaviour, which could be used to launch a DDoS attack. However,
it is also worth noting that it does not stop all forms of DDoS attack, for example a large bot-net
which simply requests many data items would not be stopped by this mechanism (although the
load may be spread over multiple publishers without allowing the attackers to choose a specific
publisher to overload, thus aiding existing load-balancing approaches to DDoS).
5. CONCLUSION
In this paper we propose a novel secure Bloom filter based forwarding mechanism for ICN. We
have demonstrated that this approach can provide good protection against DDoS attacks. The
forwarding  mechanism  uses  network  capabilities  to  identify  illegitimate  traffic,  via  its
forwarding identifier, at the ingress nodes. Using our approach, the probability of a successful a
DDoS attack can be substantially reduced in comparison to existing schemes, to the point where
an attack is unrealistic. Moreover, an attacker can be easily detected and blocked at the very
early  stages  of  the  attack.  Furthermore,  the  proposed  scheme  does  not  require  storing
forwarding state at the Edge-FW nodes in order to detect any in-progress attacks.
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